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A Review on Liao’s Dissertation Entitled “The Solutions on
Multi-choice Games” and Related Publications
Chih-Ru Hsiao
Abstract. In 2007, Liao finished his Ph.d. dissertation[18](Liao 2007) entitled “The
Solutions on Multi-choice Games”. Chapter 1 of the dissertation mainly worked on two
special cases of the H&R multi-choice Shapley value. One assumes that the weight func-
tion w(j) is a positive constant function for all j 6= 0 with w(0) = 0 and the other one
assumes that the weight function w(j) = j for all j. If w(j) ’s are equal for all j 6= 0
then the formula of H&R multi-choice Shapley value can be significantly simplified to the
original formula of the traditional Shapley value for the traditional games. Therefore, as
a matter of fact, Definitions 1 and 2 in Chapter 1 of the dissertation [18] are simply the
traditional Shapley value. Hence, in most part of Chapter 1, Liao was just writing “new
results” of traditional games in terms of the notations of multi-choice games. Further-
more, the dissertation [18] did not cited [7](1994), [8](1995a) and [10](1996) which held
the original ideas of its main part of chapter 1.
Keywords and Phrases: Multi-choice TU games, Shapley value, potential, w-consistency.
1 Introduction
Motivated by calculating the power indices of players in different levels of joint military
actions, in [5](1992) and [6](1993), Hsiao and Raghavan extended the traditional coop-
erative game to a multi-choice cooperative game and extended the traditional Shapley
value to a multi-choice Shapley value. Other researchers call the multi-choice Shapley
value the H&R Shapley value.
In [6](1993), Hsiao and Raghavan give weights(discriminations) to action levels instead
of players. The H&R Shapley value is symmetric among players and asymmetric among
actions, therefore, the H&R Shapley value is an extention of both the symmetric and the
asymmetric Shapley values.
In [3](1989), Hart and Mas-Colell were the first to introduce the potential approach
to TU games. In consequence, they proved that the Shapley value (1953) can result as
the vector of marginal contributions of a potential. The potential approach is also shown
to yield a characterization for the Shapley value, particularly in terms of an internal
consistency property.
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The H&R Shapley value is monotone, transferable utility invariant, dummy free and
independent of non-essential players, please see [5](1992), [6](1993) and [8](1995a) for
details. In 1991, when Hsiao and Raghavan presented [6] in the 2rd International Con-
ference on Game Theory at Stony-Brook, Shapley suggested that we should study the
consistent property of the H&R Shapley value.
The property of consistency is essentially equivalent to the existence of a potential
function. Following Shapley’s advice, in [7](Hsiao, Yeh and Mo 1994), Hsiao, defined the
potential function for multi-choice TU games and found an explicit formula of the po-
tential function. Moreover, Hsiao defined the w-reduced games with respect to an action
vector and a solution of multi-choice TU games. Also, Hsiao showed that the H&R Shap-
ley value is w-consistent and showed the coincidence of the H&R Shapley value and the
vector of marginal contributions of a potential. However, the definitions of the reduced
game and related consistency were incomplete in [7]. As a matter of fact, Hsiao took
full responsibility for whole of [7], Yeh and Mo were just using Mo¨bius inversion formula
to double check the explicit formula of potential function. As some referees said, there
was no evidence of the existence of [7]. Fortunately, Hsiao had the potential functions
in [10](1996) for his grant, NSC 85-2121-M-031-006(1995-1996), Taiwan. The technical
report [10](1996) holds the very original explicit formula of the potential function for
multi-choice games.
Since some definitions in [7] and [10] were incomplete, of course, Hsiao did not char-
acterize the H&R Shapley value in terms of consistency. In the Master thesis[17](1999),
under Hsiao’s supervision, Liao tried to provide an axiomatization which is the parallel
of Hart and Mas-Colell’s (1989) axiomatization of the Shapley value by applying the
w-consistency property. However, Liao failed to finish the job.
In 2007 Liao finished his Ph.D. dissertation [18] entitled “The Solutions on Multi-
choice Games” under Hwang’s supervision. In the dissertation (2007), Liao essentially
repeated the results of [7],[10] and [17] for two special cases of H&R multi-choice Shapley
value. But in the dissertation, Liao did not cite the original idea and the explicit formula
of the potential function which appeared in [7], [10] and [17].
We would rather believe that Hwang knew nothing about [7] ∼ [10] and [17]. Please
note that Liao had submitted his Master thesis [17] to Dong-Hwa university when he
applied for admission to the Ph.d. program, and [8](1995a) was published in Games and
Economic Behavior.
Chapter 1 of Liao’s dissertation mainly worked on two special cases of the H&R
multi-choice Shapley value. W.L.O.G, one assumes that w(j) = 1 for all j and the other
one assumes that w(j) = j for all j. When w(j) = 1 for all j, then the formula of H&R
multi-choice Shapley value can be significantly simplified to the formula of the traditional
Shapley value. Therefore, as a matter of fact, Definition 1 and 2 in Liao’s Chapter 1
is just a traditional Shapley value. Hence, in most part of Chapter 1, Liao was just
rewriting “new results” of traditional games in terms of the notations of multi-choice
games.
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2 Definitions and Notations
Traditional Cooperative Games and The Shapley Value We first review the tra-
ditional cooperative games and the traditional Shapley value. Following [24](Shapley
1953), we have the following definitions and notations. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set
of players. The collection of coalitions (subsets) in N is denoted by 2N = {S : S ⊆ N}.
The coalition N is called the grand coalition. The number of players in coalition S is
denoted by |S|.
A cooperative n-person game in characteristic function form is the pair (N, v) defined
by: v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. We can identify the set of all cooperative games
by: G ≃ R2
n−1.
The very original Shapley value satisfied three axioms, please see [24], for player i on
G is well-known as the function φi : G→ R such that
φi(v) =
∑
i∈S
S⊆N
(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!
n!
[v(S)− v(S − {i})] (T1)
Multi-choice Games and Multi-choice Shapley Value
The very original mathematical setup of multi-choice games in [4],[5] and [6] matches the
traditional mathematical symbols and notations. For example, a vector is denoted by a
bold face lower-case letter x in most of mathematics text books.
Since the dissertation [18]( Liao 2007) uses a different mathematical setup, we com-
promise with his notations, except bold face vector x, as following.
Let U be the universe of players. Let N ⊆ U be a set of players and let m = (mi)i∈N
be the vector that describes the number of activity levels for each player, at which he can
actively participate. For i ∈ U , we set Mi = {0, 1, · · · , mi} as the action space of player
i, where the action 0 means not participating, and M+i =Mi \ {0}. For N ⊆ U , N 6= ∅,
letMN =
∏
i∈NMi be the product set of the action spaces for players N . Denote 0N the
zero vector in RN .
Note O-1: In [5], [6], we emphasized that the action space is a well-ordered set {σ0, σ1, ....σm},
we denote the action space by {0, 1, ..., m} just for notational convenience
A multi-choice TU game is a triple (N,m, v), where N is a non-empty and finite
set of players, m is the vector that describes the number of activity levels for each
player, and v : MN → R is a characteristic function which assigns to each action vector
x = (xi)i∈N ∈ MN the worth that the players can obtain when each player i plays at
activity level xi ∈ Mi with v(0N ) = 0. If no confusion can arise, a game (N,m, v) will
sometimes be denoted by its characteristic function v. Denote the class of all multi-
choice TU games by MC . Given (N,m, v) ∈ MC and x ∈ MN , we write (N,x, v) for
the multi-choice TU subgame obtained by restricting v to {y ∈ MN | yi ≤ xi ∀i ∈ N}
only.
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Given (N,m, v) ∈ MC , let LN,m = {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ M+i }. Let w : N ∪ {0} → R
+
be a non-negative function such that w(0) = 0 and for all j ≤ l, w(0) < w(j) ≤ w(l),
then w is called a weight function. Given (N,m, v) ∈ MC and a weight function w for
the actions, a solution onMC is a map ψw assigning to each (N,m, v) ∈MC an element
ψw(N,m, v) =
(
ψwi,j(N,m, v)
)
(i,j)∈LN,m
∈ RL
N,m
.
Here ψwi,j(N,m, v) is the power index or the value of the player i when he takes action j
to play game v. For convenience, given a (N,m, v) ∈ MC and a solution ψ on MC , we
define ψi,0(N,m, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
An Important Note to readers: In [1] and [4]∼[10], we denote ψwi,j(N,m, v) as the
power index or the value of the player “j” when he takes action“ i” to play game v. That
matches the notation of traditional matrix. However, in this article, we compromise with
their notations.
To state the H&R Shapley value, some more notations will be needed. Given S ⊆ N ,
let |S| be the number of elements in S, Sc = N \ S and let eS(N) be the binary vector
in RN whose component eSi (N) satisfies
eSi (N) =
{
1 if i ∈ S ,
0 otherwise .
Note that if no confusion can arise eSi (N) will be denoted by e
S
i .
Given (N,m, v) ∈ MC and a weight function w, for any x ∈ MN and i ∈ N , we
define ‖x‖w =
∑
i∈N w(xi), ‖x‖ =
∑
i∈N xi and Mi(x;m) = {i | xi 6= mi, i 6= j}.
In [5]( Hsiao and Raghavan 1992), the H&R Shapley value γw is obtained by
γwi,j(N,m, v) =
j∑
k=1
∑
xi=k,x6=0N
x∈MN
[ ∑
T⊆Mi(x;m)
(−1)|T |
w(xi)
‖x‖w +
∑
r∈T
[w(xr + 1)− w(xr)]
]
·
[
v(x)− v(x− e{i})
] (A1)
Let x,y ∈ RN , we say y ≤ x if yi ≤ xi for all i ∈ N . In [4],[5] and [6] the analogue of
unanimity games for multi-choice games are minimal effort games (N,m, uxN), where
x ∈MN , x 6= 0N , defined by
uxN(y) =
{
1 if y ≥ x ;
0 otherwise
for all y ∈MN .
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Note O-2 In Theorem 1 of [5](1992), Hsiao and Raghavan showed that for all (N,m, v) ∈
MC , it holds that v =
∑
x∈MN
x6=0N
ax(v) uxN , where a
x(v) =
∑
S⊆S(x)
(−1)|S| v(x − eS). But in
page 8 of the dissertation [18](2007), Liao used that Theorem to give Definitions 1, 2,
and 3 and did not mention where the original ax(v) came from.
Following [7] and [10], given i ∈ N and v(x), we define div(x) = v(x) − v(x − e{i}
then di is associative, i.e. dk( di)= di( dk). For convenience, we denote di dk= dik,
dijk= di dj dk,...,etc. We also denote d i1, i2...., it=dS whenever { i1, i2, ...., it} = S.
Furthermore, we denote dS(x) by dx.
Now, it is a trivial homework for students in master program to show the following
Homework.
Homework 1 Please check that dxv(x) = a
x(v) =
∑
S⊆S(x)
(−1)|S| v(x− eS).
Readers may down-load the master thesis [17](Liao 1999) form the following web-side.
http://163.14.136.79/ETD-db/ETD-search/view etd?URN=etd-0123107-172344-1493
Please click the button “etd-0123107-172344-1493.pdf” to see the master thesis. The 6th
line of page 6 is exactly the above homework.
Now, in the proof of Theorem 1 of [8], the first two equations in page 428, we have a
very trivial “reformulation” of the H&R multi-choice shapley value (A1) as follows.
γwi,j(N,m, v) =
∑
0<xi≤j,x6=0N
x∈MN
[ ∑
S⊆S(x)
(−1)|S| v(x− eS)
]
·
w(xi)
‖x‖w
=
∑
0<xi≤j,x6=0N
x∈MN
w(xi) ·
ax(v)
‖x‖w
(A2)
Comment 1 [18]: In the footnote on page 8 of the Ph.d. dissertation [18](2007), Liao
declared that they defined H&R Shapley value in terms of dividend, i.e. they regarded
(A2) as “their definition”. But (A2) was in the proof of Theorem 1 in page 428 of
[8](Hsiao 1995a) for a long time, and Liao did not cite it. Liao knew all the results in
[4]-[10] while [17] is under our supervision.
[19]: Please see also the footnote on page 2 of [19](2007), Liao declared“∗We define the
H&R Shapley value in terms of the dividends. Hsiao and Raghavan (1993) provided an
alternative formula of the H&R Shapley value.” In other words, Liao declared that (A2)
is “their definition”.
[16]:Moreover, in page 600 of [16](Hwang, Liao 2009), at the first line below “ their”
Definition 1, they declared that Hwang and Liao provided a representation of the H&R
Shapley value by dividends. But the so called representation which they provided is (A2)
which has been in [8] since 1995. Please note that [8](1995a) is published in Games and
Economics Behavior.
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As a matter of fact, the special case of H&R Shapley value in Definition 1 of [18] can
be significantly simplified to the traditional Shapley value for a traditional TU game.
Apparently, Hwang and Liao were writing the traditional game in terms of multi-choice
game. Many researchers have the same myth.
Now, we check the special cases of (A1)=(A2). W.L.O.G, replaced w(j) by 1 for all
j > 0 in (A2), we can easily see Definition 1 and Definition 2 of Liao’s dissertation [18].
To make this article self-contained we copy “their” definition 1 and 2 as follows.
Definition 1 ([18])Peters and Zank (2005) proposed a multi-choice Shapley value, the
P&Z Shapley value. We denote the P&Z Shapley value by Γ. Formally, the P&Z Shapley
value is the solution on MC which associates with each game (N,m, v) and each (i, j) ∈
LN,mthe value
Γi,j(m, v) =
∑
x∈MN (m)
xi=j
ax(v)
|S(x)|
.
Definition 2 ([18]) Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993) proposed a multi-choice Shapley
value, the H&R Shapley value. We denote the symmetric form of the H&R Shapley value
by γ. Formally, the H&R Shapley value is the solution on MC which associates with
each game (N,m, v) and each (i, j) ∈ LN,mthe value
γi,j(m, v) =
∑
x∈MN(m)
xi≤j
ax(v)
|S(x)|
.
Comment 2 The P&Z value Γij is just a subdivision of the so called symmetric form
of the H&R Shapley value γij. Please note that γij is nothing but a special case of
(A2)=(A1) where w(j) are all equal for j 6= 0. W.L.O.G. γij is a special case of (A1)
where w(j) = 1 for all j 6= 0.
By Step 1 of the proof in Theorem 5.1 of [4](1991), in page 31, we used to give our
students the following homework.
Homework 2 Please show that∑
T⊆Mi(x;m)
(−1)|T |
w(xi)
‖x‖w +
∑
r∈T
[w(xr + 1) −w(xr)]
= 0
whenever there exists [w(xr + 1)− w(xr)] = 0.
By Homework 2, (A1) can be significantly simplified to (B1) as follows. We used to
tell our students to do the calculations.
γi,j(N,m, v) =∑
S⊆N−{i}
(|S|!)(n− |S|+ 1)!
n!
·
[
v((ji,m
S,0N−S−{i}))− v((0i,m
S,0N−S−{i})
]
,
(B1)
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where the action vector (ji,m
S,0N−S−{i}) is the action vectors that player i takes action of
level j, each player in S takes his highest-level-action and the other players in N−S−{i}
do nothing. Moreover, the action vector (0i,m
S,0N−S−{i}) is the action vectors that
player i do nothing, each player in S take his highest-level-action and the other players
do nothing.
Define a traditional game vt such that
vt(S) =
{
v((ji,m
S−{i},0N−S)) if i ∈ S
v((0i,m
S,0N−S−{i})) if i 6∈ S,
Then, (B1) is the traditional Shapley value for the traditional cooperative game vt.
Now, Since γij(v) = (B1), whatever Liao do in his dissertation [18] for Γij and γij
is simply working with the traditional Shapley value (B1) for traditional binary choice
games, i.e. the dissertation is writing the traditional Shapley value in terms of the
notations of the multi-choice Shapley value.
Please note that Γi,j(v) = γi,j(v)− γi,j−1(v), therefore the Definition 1, P&Z Shapley
value, is actually a traditional Shapley value too.
We used to let our students know: there are two ways to make the H&R Shapley value
γwij(v) become a traditional Shapley value. One is restricting v to a traditional binary
choice game, the other one is assuming that w(j)’s are equal for all j 6= 0 i.e., restricting
the H&R Shapley value to so call symmetric form. In [23](2005), Peters and Zank called
Γij(v) egalitarian solution, actually they also found (B1) in [23] form different way.
In addition to integrity, the most important part of a research is the motivation,
the motivation of the multi-choice games and the multi-choice Shapley value is to deal
with the case that a player may have different choices, and a player might need different
efforts(weights) to execute different levels of actions. If all the weights(efforts) are equal,
then we see no reason why modeling a multi-choice game, several traditional games is
enough for Definition 1 and 2. Definition 1 and 2 make the multi-choice Shapley
value lose its value!
Definition 3([18]) Derks and Peters(1993) proposed a multi-choice Shapley value, the
D&P Shapley value. We denote the D&P Shapley value by Θ. Formally, the D&P
Shapley value is the solution on MC which associates with each game (N,m, v) and
each (i, j) ∈ LN,mthe value
Θi,j(N,m, v) =
∑
x∈MN (m)
xi≥j
ax(v)
‖x‖
.
Let w(j) = j for all j, denoted this kind of weight function by w1, then by (A2) we
have
7
γw
1
i,j (N,m, v) =
∑
0<xi≤j
x∈MN
xi ·
ax(v)
‖x‖w
=
k=j∑
k=1
∑
xi=k
x∈MN
k ·
ax(v)
‖x‖
Then
1
j
·
[
γw
1
i,j (N,m, v)− γ
w1
i,j−1(N,m, v)
]
=
∑
xi=j
x∈MN
ax(v)
‖x‖
Therefore
Θi,j(N,m, v) =
∑
k≥j
1
k
·
[
γw
1
i,k (N,m, v)− γ
w1
i,k−1(N,m, v)
]
[20]: Now the D&P Shapley value is just a linear combination of H&R Shapley with
the special weight w1, the potential function in [7], [10] and [17] may also be applied to
the P&D Shapley value. Liao should cite [7], [10] or [17], even if he just works on the
potential function related to the P&D Shapley value. The publication [20](Liao 2009)
did not tell the readers where explicit formula of potential function came from.
After, Hsiao and Raghavan extended the traditional cooperative games to the multi-
choice cooperative games, researchers may try to extend any result of a traditional game
to a multi-choice game. However, if we do not have a reasonable real-world example
to justify the value of extending the result to a multi-choice game, then what we have
done might be just rewriting the result in terms of the notations of multi-choice games.
Similarly, researchers may rewrite the results of traditional games in terms of so called
fuzzy games such as [15](Hwang, Liao 2009).
[15]: There are 19 Examples in the dissertation [18], none of them has a real-world
interpretation. Reviewing the real world example in Remark 2 of [15](Hwang, Liao
2009), we find that it is essentially Example 1 in [9](Hsiao, 1995b).
3 Potential
Following [7], [10] and [17] and using the mathematical setup of [18] we see the following
definitions and notations.
For x ∈ RN , we write xS to be the restriction of x at S for each S ⊆ N . Given a
(N,m, v) ∈ MC and x ∈ MN , let i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi, for convenience we introduce the
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substitution notations x−i to stand for xN\{i}. Moreover, (x−i, j) = y ∈ R
N be defined
by y−i = x−i and yi = j. Let x,y ∈ R
N , we say y ≤ x if yi ≤ xi for all i ∈ N .
Note O-3: It is a well-known notation in reliability theory that (ji,x) denotes a vector
that the ith component is replaced by j. As a matter of fact, multi-choice games are
quite similar to multi-state coherent systems in reliability. We see no reason why the
other researchers do not make use of the well-known knowledge from reliability theory.
Following [7], [10] and [17], given (N,m, v) ∈MC and a weight function w, we define
a function Pw : MC −→ IR which associates a real number Pw(N,m, v). Subsequently,
we define the following operators :
Di,jPw(N,m, v) = w(j) ·
[
Pw
(
N, (m−i, j), v
)
− Pw
(
N, (m−i, j − 1), v
)]
and
Hi,xi =
xi∑
l=1
Di,l.
Definition O-1([7], [10], [17]) A function Pw : MC −→ IR with Pw(N, 0N , v) = 0 is
called w-potential function if it satisfies the following condition :
Given (N,m, v) ∈MC and a weight function w,∑
i∈S(m)
Hi,miPw(N,m, v) = v(m).
Theorem O-1 ([7],[10],[17])The potential of a multi-choice cooperative game is unique.
Furthermore, given a weight function w and (N,m, v) ∈ MC , the H&R Shapley value
γw and the w-potential Pw have the following relationship. For all (i, j) ∈ L
N,m,
γwi,j(N,m, v) = Hi,jPw(N,m, v).
AVery Important Note:In [7] and [10](1996), page 5, Theorem 2.1, (see also [17](1999),
page 6, Theorem 2.1), we have the following explicit closed form of the w-potential func-
tion which is the key to prove this theorem.
Given (N,m, v) ∈MC and a weight function w. Hsiao, Yeh and Mo[7] (1994) proved
that the w-potential of a multi-choice cooperative game is unique, and
Pw(N,m, v) =
∑
y≤m,
y 6=0N
1
‖y‖w
ay(v)
=
∑
y≤m,
y 6=0N
1
‖y‖w
dyv(y)
(A3)
By formula (A3), one can prove this theorem by some combinatorial calculation, please
see[7] or [17](Liao 1999), for the calculation.
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Comment 3 Because the formula (A1) of the H&R Shapley value is complicated and
the formula (A2) of the H&R Shapley value γij has a variable j and a factor w(j), it is
not easy to find the explicit closed form (A3) of the potential function Pw(N,m, v) by
observing (A1) or (A2). By try and error, Hsiao found the formula (A3) in [7] where
Hsiao took full responsibility for it. Liao finished [17] under our supervision. Therefore,
Liao knew that [7] and [10] held the original idea of (A3) of the potential function. But
Liao used special cases of the explicit formula (A3) in his dissertation [18](2007) and
did not cite any one of [7], [10] or [17], even after we reminded him to cite the papers.
The publications of Liao related to the explicit formula (A3) of the potential
function and its special cases are all doubtful.
Comment 4 [13]: There is a typo in [13](2008b), Hwang and Liao use formula (A3) in
page 596 of [13] as equation (4.3) of the potential function, but the equation (4.3) in [13]
has a big typo. We leave it to the readers to find out the big typo. We asked Liao to cite
[7], but they simply put [7] in the list of the references of [13], did not tell the readers
where (4.3) came from.
4 w-Consistency Property
Hart’s incomplete definitions First, we copy the very original definitions and no-
tations in [3](Hart 1989) for the traditional cooperative games. Then show that the
reduced game defined by Hart and Mas-Colell in 1989 was not well-defined. Therefore,
the consistent property based on the reduced game was not well-defined either. Hence a
characterization of the Shapley value proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell was incomplete.
This is the main reason why we did not send [7] or [10] for publication.
Following [3], we have the following definitions and notations. Let N be a finite set
of players and |N | denote the number of players in N .
A cooperative game with side payments - in short, a game - consists of a pair (N, v),
where N is a finite set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function satisfying
v(∅) = 0.
A subset S ⊂ N is called a coalition.
LetG denote the set of all games. Formally, a solution function φ is a function defined
on G that associated to every (N, v) ∈ G a payoff vector φ(N, v)= (φi(N, v))i∈N ∈ Rn.
Given a solution function φ, a game (N, v) and a coalition T ⊂ N , the reduced game
is defined by
v
φ
T (S) = v(S ∪ T
c)−
∑
i∈T c
φi(S ∪ T c, v)
for all S ⊂ T , where T c = N\T . The solution function φ is consistent if
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φj(T, vφT) = φ
j(N, v)
for every game (N, v), every coalition T ⊂ N and all j ∈ T .
Remark 1 Before we recognize vφT as a game, we have to provide that
v
φ
T (∅) = v(T
c)−
∑
i∈T c
φi(T c, v) = 0
That is
v(T c) =
∑
i∈T c
φi(T c, v).
In other words, φ is efficient for (T c, v).
But, in the beginning of the definition, we did not provide that φ is efficient, i.e. we
did not provide the sufficient condition which makes vφT a game. In particular, we even
did not provide that
φ1({1}, v) = 0, (***)
for the trivial one-person game ({1}, v) where v({1}) = v(∅) = 0. Therefore, given a two-
person game ({1, i}, v) such v({1}) = v(∅) = 0 and v({1, i}) = v({i}) 6= 0, for T = {i}
and φ, we can not say that the reduced game vφT is a game before we provide (***). Since
φ is defined on the set of all games, if the reduced game vφT is not a game then φ(v
φ
T )
is not defined, then the consistent property is not well-defined. To make the definition
of reduced game well-defined, Hart must ether assume that φ is efficient or assume that
v
φ
T (∅) = 0 for all T ⊂ N . Then the value of [3] is lessened.
To make this article self-contained, we copy the definition of standard for two-person
games, Theorem B and part of its proof, form page 598 and page 599 in [3](Hart 1989)
as follows.
A solution is standard for two-person games if
φi({i, j}, v) = v({i}) +
1
2
[v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})] (1.1)
for all i 6= j and all v. Thus, the “surplus ” [v({i, j}) − v({i}) − v({j})] is equally
divided among the two players. Most solutions satisfy this requirement, in particular,
the Shapley and the nucleolus.
Theorem B Let φ be a solution function. Then φ is (i)consistent and (ii) standard for
two-person games, if only if φ is the Shapley value.
We now copy, from [1], the proof that if φ satisfies (i) and (ii) then φ is efficient as
follows. Proof Assume φ satisfy (i) and (ii). We claim first that φ is efficient, i.e.,∑
i∈N
φi(N, v) = v(N) (1.2)
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for all (N, v). This indeed holds for |N | = 2 by (1.1). Let n ≥ 3, and assume (1.2)
holds for all games with less than n players. For a game (N, v) with |N | = n, let i ∈ N ;
by consistency ∑
j∈N
φj(N, v) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
φj(N\{i}, v−i) + φ
i(N, v)
where v−i ≡ v
φ
N\{i}. By assumption, φ is efficient for games with n − 1 players, thus
= v−i(N\{i}) + φ
i(N, v) = v(N)
(by definition of v−i). Therefore φ is efficient for all n ≥ 2.
Finally, for |N | = 1, we have to show that φi({i}, v) = v({i}). Indeed, let v({i}) = c,
and consider the game ({i, j}, v¯)(for some j 6= i), with v¯({i}) = v¯({i, j}) = c, v¯({j}) = 0.
By (ii), φi({i, j}, v¯) = c and φj({i, j}, v¯) = 0; hence v¯−j({i}) = c − 0 = c = v({i}), and
c = φi({i, j}, v¯) = φi({i}, v¯−j) = φi({i}, v) by consistency. This concludes the proof of
the efficiency of φ.
Note 1 The above proof, by Hart and Mas-Colell, of the efficiency of φ is incomplete, or
say, has an error. Let’s check the final statement of the proof:
c = φi({i, j}, v¯) = φi({i}, v¯−j) = φ
i({i}, v). (1.3)
We need to prove that v¯−j ≡ v before we claim φi({i}, v¯−j) = φi({i}, v), i.e. we have
to prove
v¯−j(∅) = 0 = v(∅) (1.4)
and
v¯−j({i}) = c− 0 = c = v({i}). (1.5)
Now, (1.4) holds if and only if v¯−j(∅) = v¯
φ
{i}(∅) = 0, i.e., v¯
φ
{i}(∅) = v¯({j})−φ
j({j}, v¯) =
0. Therefore, (1.4) holds if and only if v¯({j}) = φj({j}, v¯)
That is, we have to provide that φ is efficient for the one-person game ({j}, v¯) before
we claim that (1.4) hold. Please note that no matter if j is dummy or not, φ is efficient
for ({j}, v¯) if and only if v¯({j}) = φj({j}, v¯).
In other words, let player j in the above proof be the player 1 in (***), we find
that without (***), we can not reduce the two-person game ({i, j}, v) to one person
game({i}, vφ{i}). Therefore, using (i) and (ii) by adding a dummy player to show that φ
is efficient for |N | = 1 is incorrect.
Comment 5 In the 18th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook
University, USA, July 9-13 2007, we told Hart that his definitions of reduced games and
the related consistency was incomplete and he admitted it. Accordingly, the definitions of
multi-choice reduced game and related consistency in [7],[10] and [17] were all incomplete.
The credit of [3](Hart 1989) is that paper characterizes the traditional Shapley value
by just two axioms, two-person-standard and consistency, however, to make the reduced
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game well-defined, we have to impose some extra assumptions on the reduced game, then
the credit of [3] is lessened.
Finally, in [1](2010),Chiou and Hsiao fixed the error by partially consistency and
extended Hart’s ideas to a well-defined reduced game of a multi-choice game and its
solution.
However, in July 2007, we had informed Liao that the definitions of reduced multi-
choice game and related consistency in [7],[10] and [17] were all incomplete. But, after
that, they kept sending papers concerning the multi-choice reduced game and consistency
defined in [7], [10] and [17] for publication.
Hsiao’s incomplete definitions In [7], [10] and [17], we have the following definitions
which were not well-defined.
Definition O-2 Given (N,m, v) ∈MC , a weight function w and its solution,
ψw(N,m, v) = (ψwi,j(N,m, v))(i,j)∈LN,m.
For each z ∈MN , we define an action vector z∗ = (z∗i )i∈N where{
z∗i = mi if zi < mi
z∗i = 0 if zi = mi.
Furthermore, We define a new game vψ
w
z
such that
vψ
w
z
(y) = v(y ∨ z∗)−
∑
k∈S(z∗)
ψwk,mk(N, (y ∨ z
∗), v) for all y ≤ z. (A4)
We call (N, z, vψ
w
z
) a w-reduced game of v with respect to z and the solution ψw, where
(y ∨ z∗)i = max{yi, z∗i } for all i ∈ N .
Comment 6 The reduced game (A4) is not well-defined. In order to fix (A4), we must
either assume the efficiency of ψw or impose vψ
w
z
(∅) = 0 for all x 6= 0 to (A4).
Definition O-3([7], [10], [17]) Given a weight function w. A solution ψw ∈ MC is
w-consistent if for all (N,m, v) ∈MC ,
ψwi,j(N,m, v) = ψ
w
i,j(N, z, v
ψw
z ) for all i ∈ N\S(z
∗) and for all j ≤ zi.
Comment 7 In [14], [16] and [18], Hwang Liao defined a reduced game only for the H&R
Shapley value with symmetric form as following : For S ⊆ N , they denote Sc = N \ S
and 0S the zero vector in R
S . Given a solution ψ, a game (N,m, v) ∈MC , and S ⊆ N ,
the reduced game
(
N, (mS,0Sc), v
ψ
S,m
)
with respect to ψ, S and m is defined by
v
ψ
S,m(x,0Sc) = v(x,mSc) −
∑
i∈Sc
ψi,mi
(
N, (x,mSc), v
)
for all x ∈ MS.
Furthermore, they defined the consistency property only for the H&R Shapley value with
symmetric form as follows.
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Consistency : A solution ψ on MC satisfies consistency if for all (N,m, v) ∈ MC
and all S ⊆ N ,
ψi,j
(
N, (mS ,0Sc), v
ψ
S,m
)
= ψi,j(N,m, v) for all i ∈ S and j ∈M
+
i .
Clearly, the reduced game defined by Hwang and Liao’ papers is a special case of w-
reduced game. Reducing on a set of players is a special case of reducing on an action
vector. It is easy to see the following.
Given (N,m, v) ∈ MC , a solution ψ on MC and S ⊆ N . Let z = (mS,0Sc), by
definitions of vψ
z
and vψS,m, we have that v
ψ
z
(y) = vψS,m(y) for all y ≤ z = (mS,0Sc).
Hence, if a solution satisfies w-Consistency, then it satisfies Consistency.
Comment 8 None of the above definitions are well-defined, hence Hsiao didn’t send the
following Theorem for publication until 2005. In 2005, we found that Hwang and Liao
was using the results in [7], especially the explicit formula (A3) of potential function to
re-produce many papers, and did not tell the readers the originality of (A3). After that
finding, Hsiao started to send [11] for publication, the purpose of that is just to tell the
referees and the editors that the explicit formula of the potential function is originally
from [7].
The following Theorem is for general case of γw, Hwang and Liao published special
cases.
Theorem O-2([7], [10], [17]) The solution γw is w-consistent.
5 Characterization
In [17], under our supervision, Liao had the following definition.
Definition O-4 A solution function φw is standard for two-person games if
ψwi,k(N,x, v) =
k∑
t=1
∑
zi=t
zj=xj
[
w(zi)
w(zi) + w(zj)
]
·
[
v(z)− v(z− e{i})
]
+
k∑
t=1
∑
zi=t
z≤x
zj 6= xj
[
w(zi)
w(zi) + w(zj)
]
·
[
v(z)− v(z− e{i})
]
−
k∑
t=1
∑
zi=t
z≤xzj 6= xj
[
w(zi)
w(zj) + w(zj + 1)
]
·
[
v(z)− v(z− e{i}
]
where x = (0, .., xi, 0, .., xj, 0, ..0)
In [17], under our supervision, Liao had the following axiomatization which is the
parallel of Hart and Mas-Colell’s (1989) axiomatization of the Shapley value by applying
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consistency. However, since the definitions of reduced game and related consistency in
[17] are not well-defined, the following theorem is incomplete.
Theorem O-3 ([17]) Given a weight function w. A solution ψw satisfies ST and w-CON
if and only if ψw = γw.
Liao re-define Standard for two-person game as follows.
Standard for two-person game: For all (N,m, v) ∈ MC with |S(m)| ≤ 2,
ψw = γw.
With the above new definition Hwang and Liao re-produced similar Theorem in many
publications for P&Z Shapley value Symmetric form of H& R Shapley value and D&P
Shapley. However, since the original definition of reduced game in [3](Hart 1989) is not
well-defined, the publications need revision.
ConclusionAfter, Hsiao and Raghavan(1992, 1993) extended the traditional cooperative
games to the multi-choice cooperative games, researchers may try to extend any result
of a traditional game to a multi-choice game. However, if we do not have a reasonable
real-world example to justify the value of extending the result to a multi-choice game,
then what we have done might be just rewriting the result in terms of the notations of
multi-choice games.
A player in the traditional games has only two choices while a player in a multi-choice
game has more than two choices with well-ordered action levels. Therefore, in a multi-
choice game, a player has a finite well-ordered action set {σ0, σ1, ..., σm} and may raise
his action level from σ0-doing nothing to action σk with k > 1 all in once. Hence, in a
multi-choice game, we may consider a players whole reward for raising his action from
σ0 to σk. Therefore, in a multi-choice game if we consider a players reward separately
for raising action levels one by one from σj to σj+1, then there is very little difference
between studying a multi-choice game and studying a traditional game. Essentially,
many researchers are writing the traditional games in terms of multi-choice games. Since
Chapter 2 in [18], Liao considers a players reward separately for raising action levels one
by one from σj to σj+1, we are not interested in Chapter 2.
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